In the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), resource certificates completely obscure names or any other information which might be useful for contacting responsible parties to deal with issues of certificate expiration, maintenance, roll-overs, compromises, etc. This draft describes the RPKI Ghostbusters Record containing human contact information which may be verified (indirectly) by a CA certificate. The data in the record are those of a severely profiled vCard.
Introduction
In the operational use of the RPKI it can become necessary to contact, human to human, the party responsible for a resource-holding CA certificate, AKA the certificate's maintainer, be it the holder of the certificate's private key or an administrative person in the organization, a NOC, .... An important example is when the operator of a prefix described by a Route Origin Authorization (ROA) sees a problem, or an impending problem, with a certificate or CRL in the path between the ROA and a trust anchor. E.g., a certificate along that path has expired, is soon to expire, or a CRL associated with a CA along the path is stale, thus placing the quality of the routing of the address space described by the ROA in jeopardy.
As the names in RPKI certificates are not meaningful to humans, see [I-D.ietf-sidr-cp] , there is no way to use a certificate itself to lead to the worrisome certificate's or CRL's maintainer. So, "Who do you call?" This document specifies the RPKI Ghostbusters Record, an object verified via an End Entity (EE) certificate, issued under a CA certificate, the maintainer of which may be contacted using the payload information in the Ghostbusters Record.
The Ghostbusters Record conforms to the syntax defined in [I-D.ietf-sidr-signed-object].
Note that the Ghostbusters Record is not an identity certificate, but rather an attestation to the contact data made by the maintainer of the CA certificate issuing the EE certificate whose corresponding private key signs the Ghostbusters Record.
This record is not meant to supplant or be used as resource registry whois data. It gives information about an RPKI CA certificate maintainer not a resource holder.
The Ghostbusters Record is optional, CA certificates in the RPKI MAY have zero or more associated Ghostbuster Records.
This specification has three main sections. The first, Section 4, is the format of the contact payload information, a severely profiled vCard. The second, Section 5, profiles the packaging of the payload as a profile of the RPKI Signed Object Template specification [I-D.ietf-sidr-signed-object]. The third, Section 6, describes the proper validation of the signed Ghostbusters Record.
Bush
Expires The goal in profiling the vCard is not to include as much information as possible, but rather to include as few properties as possible while providing the minimal necessary data to enable one to contact the maintainer of the RPKI data which threatens the ROA[s] of concern.
The Ghostbusters vCard payload is a minimalist subset of the vCard as described in [RFC6350] .
BEGIN -pro forma packaging which MUST be the first line in the vCard and MUST have the value "BEGIN:vCard" as described in [RFC6350] .
VERSION -pro forma packaging which MUST be the second line in the vCard and MUST have the value "VERSION:4.0" as described in 3.6.9 of [RFC6350] .
FN -the name, as described in 6.2.1 of [RFC6350] , of a contactable person who responsible a the CA certificate.
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ORG -an organization as described in 6.6.4 of [RFC6350] .
ADR -a postal address as described in 6.3 of [RFC6350] .
TEL -a voice and/or fax phone as described in 6.4.1 of [RFC6350] .
EMAIL -an Email address as described in 6.4.2 of [RFC6350] END -pro forma packaging which MUST be the last line in the vCard and MUST have the value "END:vCard" as described in [RFC6350] .
Per [RFC6350] , the BEGIN, VERSION, FN, and END properties MUST be included in a record. To be useful, one or more of ADR, TEL, and EMAIL MUST be included. Other properties MUST NOT be included.
CMS Packaging
The Similarly to a ROA, a Ghostbusters Record is verified using an EE certificate issued by the resource-holding CA certificate whose maintainer is described in the vCard.
The EE certificate used to verify the Ghostbusters Record is the one that appears in the CMS data structure which contains the payload defined above.
This EE certificate MUST describe its internet number resources using the "inherit" attribute, rather than explicit description of a resource set, see [RFC3779] .
Validation
The validation procedure defined in Section 3 of
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[I-D.ietf-sidr-signed-object] is applied to a Ghostbusters Record. After this procedure has been performed, the Version number type within the payload is checked, and the OCTET STRING containing the vCard data is extracted. These data are checked against the profile defined in Section 4 of this document. Only if all of these checks pass is the Ghostbusters payload deemed valid and made available to the application that requested the payload.
Security Considerations
Though there is no on-the-wire protocol in this specification, there are attacks which could abuse the data described. As the data, to be useful, need to be public, little can be done to avoid this exposure.
Phone Numbers: The vCards may contain real world telephone numbers which could be abused for telemarketing, abusive calls, etc.
Email Addresses: The vCards may contain Email addresses which could be abused for purposes of spam.
Relying parties are hereby warned that the data in a Ghostbusters Record are self-asserted. These data have not been verified by the CA that issued the CA certificate to the entity that issued the EE certificate used to validate the Ghostbusters Record. 
File Extension
The IANA is requested to add an item for the Ghostbusters Record file extension to the RPKI Repository Name Scheme created by [I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct] as follows:
Filename Extension RPKI Object
Reference -----------------------------------------------------------
. 
